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Abstract
This paper considers the structural and institutional determinants of investment
activity in selected African countries within a neoclassical framework. Generalized
method of moments and a family of panel data estimation techniques are utilized in
addition to nonparametric kernel regression techniques to uncover the relationship.
Three main findings emerge; (i) financial openness and institutional quality are
reasonably robust structural and institutional determinants of investment activity
in Africa respectively, (ii) there is evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship and
there exist a threshold level of financial openness that achieves the highest level of
investment, (iii) using interaction terms, the inhibiting effect of financial openness is
potentially less in countries with higher levels of institutional quality, (iv) promoting
institutional quality is an effective policy towards facilitating investment activity in
Africa.
Keywords; Investments, financial openness, institutional quality, nonparametric
regression, GMM
JEL Classification; E22; O16; O38.
∗chukuachuku@gmail.com; +234 806 724 7177
†kennethonye@yahoo.com
‡hycentajah@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
As shown in a recent World Bank study, the cross-country variation in investment activity
and returns is widening and the variation is even more pronounced in Africa. Between
1980 and 2010, the rate of gross capital formation ranged between 1 and 90 percent of
production worldwide (see Lim, 2014). This widening variation in investment activity is
mostly due to the different kinds of frictions present in different economies which prevents
a normalization of the returns from investment activities across countries. This eventually,
inhibits the potential for regional integration and investment competitiveness. In order
to facilitate efforts towards regional integration in Africa, it is important to correctly
identify the factors that are responsible for the investment related frictions in African
economies. Hence, in this study, we endeavour to provide answers to questions such as,
what are the determinants of the relative investment activity in Africa, how do structural
and institutional factors influence investments and what are the possible interactions.
Addressing this question in the African context generally requires a slightly broader
approach than is used in the literature (see for examples Ndikumana, 2005; Love & Zicchino,
2006). This is particularly because of the greater diversity that exists in the region in terms
of political and institutional frameworks which is different from the relative homogeneous
characteristics of developed economies in Europe and America. The proposition we make is
that in addition to the traditional economic factors that determine investment frictions and
activity, there exist a wider set of factors including political, security, legal and institutional
dimensions that should be accounted for in understanding the dynamics of investment
activity and competitiveness in Africa.
The objective of this study is to empirically identify the broad set of factors that
explain the differences in investment activity and competitiveness in Africa in the last
three decades. The study is particularly different from others in the literature because it
considers a broader set of structural and institutional determinants that are important
to characterize the problem in the African context and does not lump developed and
developing countries together in a panel.
To preview the results, we find that among the structural variables considered, financial
openness appears to be the robust structural determinant of investment activity in Africa.
On the other hand, institutional quality appears to be the robust determinant of investment
among the institutional variables considered. We also find evidence of nonlinearities in
the relationship, suggesting that there are turning points after which the observed effects
of the structural or institutional variable is reversed. There is also weak evidence that
the potentially inhibiting effects of financial openness is dampened at higher levels of
institutional quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; section 2 collects some of the relevant
literature, section 3 highlights the empirical strategy used along with the data sources,
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section 4 contains results from the parametric and nonparametric regression analysis, while
section 5 is the conclusion with recommendations for policy.
2 Relevant literature
The theoretical and empirical literature on investment behaviour is quite established and
robust. The key references that provide detailed review of the theoretical and econometric
literature on investment behaviour can be found in Jorgenson (1971) and Clark, Greenspan,
Goldfeld, and Clark (1979). The major theoretical formulations used to define investment
behaviour can be classified under (i) simple accelerator theory, (ii) liquidity theory, (iii)
expected profits theory, (iv) Tobin’s Q theory and (v) the neoclassical theory (see Oshikoya,
1994).
The neoclassical flexible accelerator theory is often the most utilized model in the
literature especially for empirical tests using data from industrially developed economies.
In the past, data availability and structural diversity have limited the application of this
class of models for the establishment of the empirical investment relations in Africa and
other developing regions. This is particularly because key assumptions of the neoclassical
theory such as the existence of perfect capital markets, little or no public investments
among others are often not satisfied in this regions. These limitations among others
have narrowed the focus of most studies on investment behaviour in developing countries
to concentrating on explaining the causes of variations and the determinants of private
investments (see Oshikoya, 1994, for example)
Economic size, (i.e GDP) and economic growth are hypothesized to be positively related
to investments. This relation is mostly derivable from the flexible accelerator model which
assumes that there is a fixed relationship in the production function between the desired
capital stock and the level of output (see Fry, 1980). Bank credits are also hypothesised to
be have a positive impact on investment activity. The effect on investments works directly
through the the stock of credit available to firms. This positive impact have been found in
many studies for developing economies (see Levine, 2002; Fry, 1980)
The impact of government spending and consumption on investment activity is theo-
retically ambiguous. The reason is because there are at list two known possible channels
through which public expenditure could affect investment activity. On the one hand,
public sector spending that results in high fiscal deficits may crowd out private investments
through high interest rates, credit rationing and higher current and future tax burdens.
On the other hand, if most of government spending is concentrated on infrastructure
(such as transportation, communication, security, etc.), then government expenditure and
investments is likely to be complemetary with private investments (see Blejer & Khan,
1984, for early evidence in the literature)
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Recently, Lim (2014) has shown that in addition to traditional macroeconomic variables,
it is also important to consider structural and institutional variables to understand the
variation in worldwide investment variation. The paper uses data from 129 developed
and developing countries to show that financial development and institutional quality
are reasonably robust determinants of cross-country investment variations. Our study is
closely related to the study by Lim (2014) in a broad sense, although we focus on Africa
and try to address some of the potential shortcomings arising from the common practise
of estimating the relationship using instrument based techniques like GMM. Here, we
address this problem by considering nonparametric regression techniques.
3 Empirical strategy and data
3.1 Parametric specification
The empirical strategy adopted in the study is theoretically motivated from a standard
neoclassical growth formulation (see Lim, 2014, for a similar application), where production
is constant returns to scale and given by the Cobb-Douglas specification
Yit = e
zKαitL
1−α
it (1)
Where Yit is level of output in country i, e
z is technology which is subject to a stochastic
AR(1) shock process thus; zt = ρzt−1 + . While Kit and Lit are the capital and labour
used in production in country i and α is the share of capital in output. Where capital
stock evolves according to the following equation of motion
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Kit + Iit (2)
The optimal capital stock in country i at time t is given as the weighted ratio of real
output Yit and the cost of capital Rit hence
K∗it =
αYit
Rσit
(3)
where σ is the substitution elasticity of capital. Using the familiar result from neoclassical
growth theory that in steady state with a balanced growth path µ, the growth rate of
output, capital and consumption are equal, we can plug in the optimal level of capital (3)
into the steady state equation of motion for (2) to obtain an expression for investment as
Iit =
α(δ + µ)Yit
Rσit
(4)
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By taking the logarithm of both sides of (4), we obtain an estimable equation for investment
given as
ln Iit = lnα + ln(δ + µit) + lnYit − σ lnRit (5)
Where lnα is the constant term and ln(δ + µit) ≡ git is the depreciation-adjusted growth
rate in country i. To account for the additional structural and institutional variables
which the neoclassical growth theory abstracts from, we include additional economic and
structural variables in the vector Xit and institutional variables in the vector Zit, plus an
error term it so that the complete econometric estimation equation becomes
iit = β + ρii,t−1 + φgit + ϕyit − σrit + Ω′Xit + Ψ′Zit + it (6)
Where the lower-case letters indicate the logarithms of the variables and bold letters are
vectors. Further, an investment smoothing term ii,t−1 is also introduced to account for
partial-adjustment behaviour in capital formation observed in the literature (see Eberly,
Rebelo, & Vincent, 2012)
The baseline regression equation in (6) is primarily estimated by system generalized
method of moments (GMM) with robustness tests conducted using pooled regression and
standard instrumental variable (I.V) techniques. The main advantage of using the system
GMM technique is to enable us exploit the efficiency gains that arise from considering the
instrument set as a system especially given that the number of cross section identifiers are
less than the time series (i.e N<T). This method also allows us to take care of potential
endogeniety problems.
3.2 Nonparametric specification
The GMM specification highlighted in the previous section is often robust when there are
obvious concerns about endogenity and one is able to obtain relevant and valid instruments
that correctly identify the parameters of interest. Often, researchers are not always blessed
with instruments that satisfy these conditions. Further, the GMM specification may be
very restrictive in the sense that it presupposes the existence of a linear relationship with
monotonicities.
In this section, we consider a class of models that are less restrictive in terms of
specifying the form of the relationship and at the same time capable of handling problems of
endogeniety in the relationship between structural and institutional variables on investment
in Africa. Specifically, we consider nonparametric regression techniques in the spirit of
Racine, Hart, and Li (2006). However, to justify the application of this technique we first
test a parametric version of the model to determine whether the relationship is nonlinear
and non-monotic.
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To achieve this, we employ Hsiao, Li, and Racine (2007)’s nonparametric and consistent
test for correct specification of parametric model. Our choice of this method is because it
admits the mix of continuous and categorical data types. Using this approach, the null
hypothesis can be stated as follows: HO : E(Y |x) = m(x, γ0), for almost all x and for some
γ0 ∈ B ⊂ Rp. Where m(x, γ) is a known function with γ being a p× 1 vector of unknown
parameters which includes a linear regression model as a special case and B is a compact
subset of Rp. The alternative is the negation of HO, that is H1 : E(Y |x) ≡ g(x) 6= m(x, γ)
for all γ ∈ B on a set with a positive measure. The studentized version of the test statistic
from this test is denoted by Jn.
1 For our application, we use the computed Jn test statistic
with i.i.d draws generated from 399 bootstrap resampling with bandwidths selected by
cross-validation. As we will show latter in the results section, the significance test for the
parametric model is not satisfied, hence the need for a nonparametric specification which
is outlined hereunder.
The generic specification for the nonparametric regression is given thus;
yit = g(Xit,Zit) + it, i = 1, 2 . . . N, t = 1, 2, . . . T (7)
where g(.) is assumed to be a smooth and continuous but unknown function. Xit is a
vector of the economic controls while Zit is a vector of the institutional and structural
variables of interest. Since the GMM and hence parametric specification in (6) is a special
case of the nonparametric specification, it means that (7) is capable of automatically
capturing linear and nonlinear effects including interaction and potential endogenity effects
in the relationship without the need for a manual search.
Nonparametric econometric estimation techniques are often computationally involved,
and in addition to the computational involvement, nonparametric multiple regressions
techniques suffer from two major obstacles. First is the “curse-of-dimensionality” and
second is the “difficulty of interpretation”. The curse-of-dimensionality arises due to the
deterioration of the rates of convergence of kernel methods as the number of regressors
increases, which could lead to imprecise but consistent estimation of the object of interest.
However, as Huynh and Jacho-Cha´vez (2009) have shown, this “curse” appears to be a
“blessing” in this kind of setup. The reason is because by the nature of the construction of
the institutional variables which is often by unobserved component model, their precision
is dominated by the overall slow rate of convergence of the nonparametric estimators, and
therefore no correction of standard errors is required.
We use the np package in R, developed by Hayfield and Racine (2008) to estimate the
nonparametric model. In the data frame, we cast the variable countryit as an categorical
factor variable and year as a ordered factor variable, while the control variables in the
Xit and Zit vectors are the continuous variables. This is a typical case of nonparametric
1Interested readers may want to see Racine (2008; 63-64) for more details.
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regression with mix regressors.2
3.3 Data and Variables
The data set covers 22 African countries 3 over the period 1980-2011. The main sources
are the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) and the Polity IV database
published by Systemic Peace. Other data were retrieved from Chinn and Ito (2012) and
the Penn World Table (PWT) version 8.0. More specifically, output and output growth are
measured by real GDP and real GDP growth rate from the WDI. Variables for economic
control; government consumption, inflation and trade openness are sourced from the WDI.
For robustness we alternate measures of investment using fixed investment rate (fixed
capital formation share of GDP) from the WDI and the real capital stock. The cost
of capital measured by real interest rate is obtained from the WDI. Financial openness
index is obtained from Chinn and Ito (2008, updated). The human development index is
retrieved from the PWT and it represents the index of human capital per person based on
years of schooling as in Barro and Lee (2013) and returns to education as in Psacharopoulos
(1994).
We measure financial development using domestic credit to private sector share of GDP
retrieved from the WDI. We proxy institutional quality and institutional structure using
scores of executive constraint and scores of democratic accountability respectively and
are obtained from polity IV database. These variables are hypothesised to be important
in the sense that the quality and structure of institutional mechanisms such as rule of
law, contract enforcement, property right and judicial system can influence aggregate
investment through altering incentive for new investment (Besley, 1995), or by increasing
the sensitivity of investment to technological shocks at the macroeconomic level (Cooley,
Marimon, & Quadrini, 2004). To capture business environment we use polity scores
from polity IV project dataset. Full details of data sources and description are given in
Appendices.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 the summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented. An
interesting point to note is the relative sizes of the standard deviation of the structural and
2A gentle description of these estimation strategies can be found in the Racine (2008). Nonparametric
Econometrics: A Primer.
3The list of countries are: Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The
Gambia, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Egypt, Morocco, Rwanda
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institutional variables compared with the economic controls. For example, the standard
deviation of financial development a structural variable is 25.28 which is relatively large
compared to some of the economic controls such as interest rates 13.24, inflation 22.23
and GDP 2.30. This provides preliminary support for the argument that structural and
institutional variables may have non-trivial effects on investments.
In the Appendix section, Table 8 contains the pairwise correlation matrix for the
variables. The interesting combinations are the correlation between the structural and
institutional variables. We observe that financial openness a structural variable is weakly
correlated with the institutional variables. As we obtain correlation coefficients between
financial openness and institutional quality of ρ = 0.10, for institutional structure it is
ρ = 0.18 and ρ = 0.11 for business environment although the relationships are statistically
significant. This therefore suggest that the relationship between these set of variables are
sufficiently weak enough to justify their just inclusion as conditioning variables in the
empirical models.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Fixed Investments 678 19.96 10.63 −2.42 113.58
Investments 689 92.78 189.12 0.09 1,224.88
Financial Openness 696 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.00
LGDP 689 26.65 2.30 21.36 30.72
Business Environment 671 −1.55 6.46 −10 10
Institutional Quality 671 3.38 2.02 1 7
Interest rates 606 5.76 13.24 −53.44 60.69
Inflation 646 14.67 22.23 −17.64 200.03
GDP growth 685 4.28 6.97 −50.25 71.19
Human Development 640 1.83 0.41 1.13 2.85
Trade openness 688 71.81 38.07 6.32 275.23
TFP 458 1.55 3.56 0.57 29.67
Institutional structure 671 2.60 3.44 0 10
Financial development 665 21.38 25.21 1.54 167.54
Stock market 241 8.08 22.42 0.00 148.77
4.2 Benchmark GMM results
The benchmark results for the GMM specification in Equation 6 are reported in Table 2. We
adopt an incremental approach whereby, we start with the baseline explanatory variables
suggested by neo-classical theory and then incrementally include economic, structural
and institutional variables to the right hand side respectively. We start by considering
diagnostic tests for the overall model specification. First, the joint significance of the
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variables included in each of the regressions in Table 2 is given by the Wald χ2 statistic
which is statistically significant for all the regressions. Secondly, tests for over-identifying
restriction and instrument validity for the included instruments as captured by Hansen’s J
statistic cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
A caveat is however important at this point since as noted by Parente and Silva
(2012) tests of overidentifying restrictions are not very informative about the validity
of the moment conditions implied by the underlying economic model, and are therefore
not reliable at identifying the parameters of interest. Further, the z-statistic test for
Arellano-Bond AR(2) for second-order autocorrelation in the residuals show that there is
no second-order autocorrelation, thereby justifying the non inclusion of more lags of the
dependent variable on the right hand side.
Table 2: GMM regressions with fixed investment as dependent variable
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10
Fixed investt−1 0.72*** 0.96*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.85*** 0.77*** 0.67*** 0.51*** 0.78*** 0.58***
(0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19)
LGDP 0.06 0.45 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.25
(0.39) (0.43) (0.51) (0.44) (0.71) (0.68) (0.82) (0.81) (0.44) (1.15)
GDP growth 0.42 1.01** 0.76* 0.78* 0.91** 0.73** 0.46 0.09 0.55 0.32
(0.50) (0.52) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.35) (0.32) (0.40) (0.34) (0.54)
Interest rate -0.43* -0.75** -0.93*** -0.90*** -0.84*** -0.76*** -0.90*** -0.90*** -0.48*** -1.15*
(0.22) (0.33) (0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) (0.29) (0.27) (0.16) (0.67)
Inflation 0.24* 0.33** 0.31** 0.29** 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.14
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.21) (0.25) (0.08) (0.37)
Govt. consumption 0.82** 0.77** 0.68** 0.75** 0.98** 1.09** 0.41** 0.85*
(0.36) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33) (0.46) (0.51) (0.20) (0.51)
Financial openness -2.79 -2.52 -2.67 -4.73 -5.50 -3.40** -6.89
(2.66) (2.72) (2.55) (3.54) (4.00) (1.69) (4.35)
Trade openness 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09)
Financial development -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06)
Institutional quality -0.23 0.59 0.41 0.31
(0.57) (1.54) (0.77) (1.49)
Institutional structure -0.52 -1.99 0.16
(1.06) (1.64) (1.54)
Business environ 0.93 -0.20
(0.83) (0.59)
Human cap. dev. 2.31
(5.41)
Constant 6.21 9.20 -12.78 -9.97 -11.92 -11.83 -10.48 -7.81 -0.71 -10.46
(10.25) (11.63) (17.38) (14.63) (20.13) (19.85) (24.43) (26.47) (13.06) (27.05)
N 537 508 508 508 508 490 461 461 429 421
Hansen’s J 5.55 1.79 1.86 1.87 1.88 2.07 2.03 2.60 5.86 1.00
Wald χ2 253*** 105*** 194*** 198*** 196*** 278*** 270*** 975*** 2211*** 227***
AR(2) z 0.99 1.12 0.58 0.61 0.73 0.75 0.38 0.24 0.92 -1.22
Instruments 9 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 17 15
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance symbols on coefficients are; *, ** and *** for the 10, 5 and 1% levels
respectively.
Column (M1) in Table 2 contains the specification that represents the baseline neoclas-
sical theory which posits that investment is a function of economic size (LGDP), economic
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growth and cost of capital (interest rate). In columns (M2) and (M3) we introduce
economic controls; inflation and government expenditure respectively. The first category
of structural variables we introduce in columns (M4) and (M5) are the open-economy
effects measured by financial openness and trade openness which have been shown to be
significant determinants of medium term investments (see Loayza, Chong, & Calderon,
1999; Chinn & Prasad, 2003).
What we see is that there is evidence of persistence in inflation as the coefficient on
the lagged term ranges between 0.51 and 0.96 and is statistically significant in all the
regressions. Also, the estimated signs on economic size, economic growth and interest rate
are in line with the apriori expectations. However, although economic size is not significant
in all the regressions, we find that the effect of economic growth is statistically significant
in some regressions and economically significant in all the regressions. The interesting
part about this category of variables is the result on interest rate which is negative and
statistically significant. This is interesting because although this is what neoclassical theory
postulates, the extant literature has struggled to establish this relationship empirically, and
this could be because those studies generally neglect the additional institutional variables
which this study accounts for (see Caballero & Engel, 1999; Lim, 2014, for examples).
The coefficient on inflation surprisingly assumes a positive sign and is statistically
significant in some of the regressions contrary to the apriori expectation. Government
consumption is positive and statistically significant in all the regressions. In our benchmark
regression-column (M5), the coefficient is 0.77. Hence a one percent increase in the ratio
of government consumption to GDP could on average lead to around 0.77 percent increase
in the level of investment in the economy. This result is not very surprising as the public
sector in most African economies are significantly large.
We get negative and non-trivial coefficients on the financial openness variable although
the coefficients are not significant in all the regressions. The expected effects of financial
openness on investments is not obvious a priori. However, the negative effect observed
here could be interpreted in different ways. First, it implies that ceteris paraibus, more
financially open economies seem to experience lower levels of investments. This would
be the case if foreign direct investments crowd out domestic investments (see Agosin &
Machado, 2005, for empirical evidence). In other words, foreign direct investments flows
substitute and displace domestic investments more than one-for-one. Another possible
explanation provided in Lim (2014) is that if returns to investments are higher abroad,
then greater financial openness could lead to net capital outflows which reduces the level
of domestic savings available for domestic investments. Another explanation could be the
financial contagion effect in which case, financial openness could allow for the transmission
of financial crises which could lead to investment contractions in the domestic economy.
To pin down the effect that is operative in the African context would be beyond the scope
of the present study.
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Table 3: GMM regressions with gross level of investment as dependent variable
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
Investmentst−1 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.95*** 0.97***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
LGDP 0.53 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.38 0.95* 0.67
(0.40) (0.22) (0.25) (0.27) (0.33) (0.31) (0.36) (0.24) (0.57) (0.84)
GDP growth 0.03 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.36 0.03
(0.15) (0.24) (0.37) (0.38) (0.23) (0.28) (0.29) (0.17) (0.25) (0.52)
Interest rate -0.19 -0.04 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.10 -0.20
(0.29) (0.15) (0.25) (0.26) (0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) (0.15) (0.69)
Inflation -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.20 -0.22 -0.21 -0.16 -0.20
(0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.15) (0.34)
Govt. consumption 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.03 -0.05
(0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.51)
Financial openness 1.54 1.47 1.41 1.12 1.09 -0.21 2.12
(1.61) (1.72) (1.62) (1.92) (1.81) (2.87) (1.99)
Trade openness -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
Financial development -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Institutional quality 0.30 1.56** 1.04 1.32*
(0.28) (0.76) (1.22) (0.72)
Institutional structure -0.79 -1.79* -1.12*
(0.54) (1.06) (0.64)
Business environ 0.59 0.23
(0.56) (0.23)
Human cap. development -0.12
(2.94)
Constant 16.65 10.11* 8.05 5.73 8.24 8.94 8.70 10.82 29.99 24.07
(13.17) (6.12) (9.18) (10.33) (13.96) (14.12) (15.77) (10.64) (21.30) (37.35)
N 549 521 519 519 519 501 472 471 434 425
Hansen’s J 7.19 0.58 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.52 0.60 2.22 5.51 0.79
AR(2) z -1.85 -1.30 -1.35 -1.32 -1.40 -1.26 -1.20 -1.14 -1.07 -0.71
Instruments 9 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 17 15
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance symbols on coefficients are; *, ** and *** for the 10, 5 and 1% levels
respectively.
For financial development, just like results available in the literature, it is difficult
to make strong conclusions about the effects of financial development on investments,
however, this result will be revisited in other specifications consider in the paper. When
we include additional structural and institutional variables in columns (M6, M7, M8, M9,
M10), we observe inconsistency in the signs of the variables and besides that, they are all
statistically not significant. This inconsistency may be arising from the problems inherent
in the estimation technique used here. It is possible that the instruments mechanism
used for the institutional variables are weak. Besides, it could also be the case that the
problems of endogenity we are accounting for may not be a serious concern here. In the
sections that follow, we also present results from alternative estimation techniques.
4.3 Robustness to GMM benchmark
In this section, we consider the robustness of the benchmark results to alternative mea-
surement of the dependent variable. In the previous section we used the ratio of gross
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fixed capital formation to GDP which is a flow measure of the value of acquisitions of
new or existing fixed assets by the business sector, governments and households. To offer
a variant to the conceptualization of investments, we use the gross level of investments
(inclusive of inventory accumulation) which is a stock variable as an alternative measure
of the dependent variable.
The results for gross investment as dependent variable are reported in Table 3. Again,
overall model diagnostic tests reveal that the instruments used are valid as we cannot
reject the null of Hansen’s J test of overidentifying restrictions for the instruments. Also,
there is no evidence of second-order serial autocorrelation, hence it is sufficient to use only
the first period lags as part of the right hand side variables. The Wald χ2 test also reveals
that the variables included in all the regressions are jointly significant although the results
are not reported in the table for the sake of space.
For the robustness results, we focus on column (R10) as the benchmark. The quantita-
tive coefficients from the robustness regressions are not directly comparable to those in
Table 2, but the qualitative effects are comparable. We observe that there is even higher
persistence in the gross levels of investments as the coefficient ranged between 0.95 and
0.98 in the different robustness regressions. Further, the qualitative signs on the baseline
variables of economic size, economic growth and interest rates are preserved although
they are mostly not significant. The economic controls here assume the expected sign as
inflation enters with a negative sign and government consumption enters with a positive
sign though again both are not statistically significant.
The interesting aspect of the robustness regressions is that the effect of institutional
variables have now become obvious, and they are mostly consistent and statistically
significant. The coefficient on institutional quality is bound by [0.3 and 1.56] and is quite
quantitatively significant. Specifically, a one percent improvement in institutional quality
could translate into increase in investments of around 1.56%. By contrasting the negative
impact of institutional structure and the positive impact of business environment, it is
possible to say something about the importance of institutions in fostering broad based
economic opportunities and competition dynamics as highlighted in the influential work
by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Overall, the regressions with gross level of investments
as dependent variable reaffirms the quantitative and qualitative results obtained in the
benchmark regressions and also provides some evidence on the effects of institutional
variables.
4.4 Interactions between structural and institutional variables
In this subsection, we examine the interaction effects of structural and institutional
variables on fixed investments. This exercise is to help us obtain further insight into the
conditions under which institutional variables may influence investment patterns, given
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Table 4: Fixed investments regressions with interaction terms
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Fixed investt−1 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.69*** 0.68***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
LGDP 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.17
(0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) (0.50)
GDP growth 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09
(0.28) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28) (0.30)
Interest rate -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -0.55***
(0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
Inflation 0.14*** 0.09 0.13** 0.14*** 0.10 0.10
(0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Govt. consumption 0.45** 0.49** 0.46* 0.48* 0.45* 0.47*
(0.20) (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25)
Financial openness -2.80* -2.87** -2.89* -2.71* -3.45** -3.10**
(1.46) (1.45) (1.57) (1.58) (1.64) (1.53)
Trade openness 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Financial development -0.01 0.11 0.07
(0.03) (0.16) (0.08)
Institutional quality -0.03 0.47
(0.35) (0.48)
Institutional structure -0.09 0.21
(0.25) (0.31)
Financial opn. × inst.qlty -3.66
(3.66)
Financial opn. × instruc -1.96
(1.89)
Constant -7.40 -7.02 -7.73 -8.10 -10.71 -10.98
(13.74) (13.71) (13.51) (13.79) (14.99) (15.16)
N 438 434 433 433 429 429
Hansen’s J 7.38 7.11 6.76 6.22 6.39 6.30
Wald χ2 996*** 999*** 1031*** 1129*** 1579*** 1489***
AR(2) z 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.73
Instruments 17 17 17 17 17 17
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance symbols on coefficients are; *, ** and *** for
the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
the structural conditions. Specifically, we interact the main structural variable in the
model (i.e. financial openness), with two of the institutional variables used.
From the results which are reported in Table 4, column (T5) and (T6) are the results
for the interaction between financial openness with institutional quality and financial
openness with institutional structure respectively. From column (T5) we see that the
sign on the interaction coefficient between financial openness and institutional quality
is negative. We can interpret this result to mean that the potential negative effect of
financial openness on investment is less in countries with higher levels of institutional
quality. This relationship is also true for institutional structure. This conclusion should be
taken only as indicative at this point since the coefficients are not statistically significant.
This relationship will be revisited when we consider the non-parametric regressions.
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Table 5: Regression results from parametric models
Pooled OLS Fixed effect Random effect
Constant -9.26∗∗ -23.12∗∗∗
(4.48) (7.37)
Log(GDP) 0.83∗∗∗ 0.54 1.2∗∗∗
(0.15) (1.48) (0.26)
GDP growth 0.09 0.01 0.04
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Interest rates -0.01 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Inflation -0.08∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Government consumption 0.26∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Financial Openness 0.02 2.3∗∗ 1.74∗
(0.94) (1.03) (0.91)
Trade openness 0.07∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Financial development -0.01 -0.02 0
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Business Environment 0.27 -0.83∗∗∗ -0.71∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.24) (0.2)
Institutional Quality 2∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.48) (0.43) (0.43)
Institutional structure -1.19∗∗∗ 0.73∗ 0.58
(0.38) (0.44) (0.37)
Human Development -2.35∗∗ -5.86∗∗ -5.53∗∗∗
(0.99) (2.62) (1.16)
R2 0.29 0.35 0.34
Effect None Two-way Individual
Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance symbols on coefficients
are; *, ** and *** for the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
4.5 Non-parametric results
In this section, we begin by justifying the use of nonparametric regression estimation
techniques by presenting the results from alternative parametric specifications and con-
ducting a nonparamteric test for correct model specification. In Table 5 the results for
three alternative parametric models are reported including; pooled OLS, panel fixed effect
and random effect.
By concentrating on the results from the fixed effect regression which has the highest
R2 value among the alternatives, we observe that apart from a few differences, most of the
results obtained corroborate the results from the instrument based GMM estimation in
Table 2 and Table 3. The advantage we have here is that more variables are additionally
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statistically significant. Particularly interesting are the coefficients for trade openness,
business environment and human development index. Without banging on the results from
this class of parametric regression since they have been discussed in a previous section,
we move straight to consider the results from Hsiao et al. (2007)’s nonparametric and
consistent model specification test for this class of models.
The Jn statistic for the null of correct model specification with 399 IID bootstrap
replications is 9.33 with a 0.00 p-value. Therefore the null of correct model specification
for all the parametric models are rejected at the 1% level. Some of the implications of
these result are as follows. First, a linear specification for the investment relation in Africa
maybe too restrictive as it implies that the relationship is constant over time and it ignores
potential nonlinearities in the relationship. Secondly, it implies that the conclusions and
perhaps policy implications derivable from any parametric specification of this relationship
will be sensitive to the kind of model used. In other words, results are likely to be
different with different estimation techniques. This is confirmed by the differences in the
results obtained from the GMM and panel based estimation techniques reported. These
limitations of parametric specifications for the investment relation in Africa motivates our
estimation of the computationally involved nonparamteric relationship between investment
and structural and institutional variables.
Table 6: Optimal bandwith selection
Variable Bandwith
L.GDP 0.0185
GDP growth 28.674
Interest rate 7.168
Inflation 41.097
Government consumption 3.105
Finiancial openness 0.9988
Trade openness 18.313
Financial development 2.525
Business environment 11823203
Institutional quality 88815043
Institutional structure 5877867
Human development 0.7205
Factor.Country 0.0531
Factor. Year 0.4915
Notes: Results are based on local regressions and bandwidths are selected by least squares
cross validation. Objective function value is 9.04 achieved on 2 multistarts. For continuous
explanatory variables, we use second-order Gaussian continuous kernel. For the factor variable,
we use Aitchison and Aitken kernel method, while Li and Racine kernel method is used for
the ordered variable.
To estimate a nonparametric regression model, we need to obtain the optimal bandwidth
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for each of the regressors and since the baseline model is cast in a panel data framework,
we are faced with a situation where we have regressors of mixed data type. That is, we
have continuous variables which are all the controls in Equation 7, a categorical variable
which are the countries and an ordered variable which is time. The results for the optimal
bandwidth selection for each of the variables is presented in Table 6. The results are based
on local regressions and bandwidths are selected by least squares cross validation. The
objective function value is 9.04 achieved on 2 multistarts.4 For continuous explanatory
variables, we use second-order Gaussian continuous kernel. For the factor variable, we use
Aitchison and Aitken kernel method, while Li and Racine’s kernel method is used for the
ordered variable.
Table 7: Non-parametric Kernel regression significance tests
Variable P-values
IID Wild-Rademacher
L.GDP 0.84 0.96
GDP growth 0.86 0.9
Interest rate 0.77 0.45
Inflation 0.62 0.72
Government consumption 0.73 .03**
Finiancial openness 0.42 0.71
Trade openness 0.28 0.7
Financial development 0.63 0.25
Business environment .002** 0.00***
Institutional quality 0.27 .00***
Institutional structure 0.86 0.92
Human development 0.91 0.47
IID indicates that the p-values are obtained by paramteric bootstrap resampling from the
normal distribution, whereas, Wild-rademacher will use a wild bootstrap transformation with
Rademacher variables. This approach has the advantage of controlling for heteroscedasticity of
unknown form on the DGP
4.5.1 Nonparametric significance test for kernel regression
Nonparametric regressions do not produce point parameter estimates, thus the standard
t-testing approach used to identify significant parameters does not apply here. However,
there is still a sense in which the significance of the regressors could still be tested. We
implement univariate nonparametric significance tests for mixed data type based on Racine
et al. (2006) and Racine (1997) to all the regressors. This test is comparable to the
t-test in parametric regression. The class of tests formulated by Racine et al. (2006) are
4It is often recommended that at least 5 multistarts be used to achieve the objective function value
when computer performance is high. However, due to the many hours it takes to run this, we have decided
to use 2 multistarts as this does not compromise the results in any significant way.
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known to be robust to functional misspecification among the class of twice continuously
differentiable functions. Also, the null-distribution of the test has correct size and the
test has power in the direction of the class of twice continuously differentiable alternatives
see Racine (1997). To conduct this test, partition the vector of explanatory variables
say W into two parts. The variable whose significance is to be tested W(j) and all other
conditioning variables W(−j) excluding W(j). The partitioned matrix of conditioning
variables (continuous and dummy) is written as W = (W(−j),W(j)), where W(−j) ∈ Rp−j
and W(j) ∈ Rj. If the conditional mean E(Y |W ) is independent of a variable or group
of variables of interest, then the true but unknown vector of partial derivatives of the
conditional mean of dependent variables with respect to these variable is zero. That is,
the test is formulated to detect whether a partial derivate equals 0 over the entire domain
of the variable in question. The null hypothesis is stated in terms of the vector of partial
derivates of the conditional mean thus;
HO;
∂E(Y |W )
∂W(j)
= 0 for all w ∈ W
HA;
∂E(Y |W )
∂W(j)
6= 0 for some w ∈ W
where W(j) is the regressor we are testing for and W is the vector of all regressors continuous
and dummies.
The results for the significance test are reported in Table 7. The p-values are obtained by
bootstrapping because the relevant distributions under the null and alternative hypothesis
are non-standard. Column two contains the results for IID bootstraps which shows that
only business environment is statistically significant. Too much cannot be said about this
result because it does not account for potential heterogeneity of unknown form in the
data generating process. This motivates the consideration of the alternative bootstraping
technique using “wild” bootstraping schemes with Rademacher variables. The results
are reported in column 3 of Table 7. We find that with heteroskedasticty accounted for
government consumption, business environment and institutional quality have statistically
significant p-values.
4.5.2 Investment profile curves, surface plots and contour maps
Since nonparametric regressions do not produce coefficients for the regressors, to see the
results of nonparametric regression, we need to plot the profile curves, surface curves
and or co-plots of the regressors. The investment profile curves with bootstrap standard
errors are reported in Figure 5 and they give an isolated picture of the marginal effect
of each regressor on investments. However, since we are specifically interested in the
combined effects of structural and institutional variables, we focus on the surface plots
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Figure 1: Fitted surface for kernel regression of investments on Finop. and Instqlty
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and contour maps. We use institutional quality as the baseline institutional variable since
it achieves significance in most of the models compared to the other institutional variables
and then we alternate significant structural variables to understand their combined effects
on investments.
Figure 2: Contour maps for kernel regression of investments on Finop. and Instqlty
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In Figure 1 the surface plot for the fitted values of the nonparametric regression of
fixed investment on financial openness and institutional quality is reported. From the plot,
we observe that the relationship of investments to financial openness and institutional
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quality appears to be nonlinear, especially in the direction of financial openness. Also, the
partial regression in the direction of each predictor does not appear to change very much
as the other predictor varies, suggesting that the additive nonpararmetric model used is
likely to be the appropriate specification.
Specifically, we observe from Figure 1 that at very low levels of financial openness,
investment to GDP ratio is almost zero. However, as the level or index of financial openness
increases, investments begin to rise and peaks when the level of financial openness is
somewhere around 0.4, after which higher levels of the financial openness index leads to
reductions in the level of investment. This result implies that there is a threshold level
of financial openness that is best for these economies. Levels of financial openness less
or greater than this threshold will be suboptimal and will lead to reductions in the level
of investments. One possible explanation for this relationship could be the competing
and crowding out effects that may be operative between FDI and domestic investments
given the level of financial openness. When a country is relatively financially closed to the
global financial market, investments are lower since financial mobilization only depends on
domestic savings. On the other hand, an economy that is relatively too financially open
will attract a lot of FDI which could crowd out domestic investments and with repatriation
of funds by foreign investors, domestic investments will eventually shrink.
Further, we observe a seemingly linear and monotonically increasing relationship in
the direction of institutional quality. In other words better and better institutions lead to
more and more investments.
Figure 3: Fitted values and contour maps for investments on Findev and Instqlty
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(a) Fitted surface for investments on Findev
(b) Contour maps for investments on Findev
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The contour maps are a cross-sectional representation of the three dimensional graphs.
In specific terms, the contour maps presented here are two dimensional diagrams that
connect specific points of the structural and institutional variable to the same estimated
level of investment, i.e, they are Iso-investment lines. In Figure 2 we report the contour
maps for the iso-investment given different levels of financial openness and institutional
quality. We observe that there are two possibilities for the highest iso-investment curve
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at 25. One is at the point where financial openness is low (around 0.2) and institutional
quality is also low (around 2) and the other is when there is very high financial openness
(around 0.8) and very high levels of financial quality around 6). This confirms the nonlinear
relationship earlier observed and a lot more can be said about this.
Figure 4: Fitted values and contour maps for investments on Govtcon and Instqlty
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(a) Fitted surface for investments on Gvtcon
(b) Contour maps for investments on Gvtcon.
Govt. consumption
In
st
itu
tio
na
l q
ua
lity
10 20 30 40 50
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
In Figure 3 we report similar results for the case when we use an alternative measure of
structural characteristic, here financial development. Again, we observe nonlinearities in
the relationship between investment and financial development with institutional quality
held constant (see Figure 3a). Specifically, we find that in spite of institutional quality,
higher levels of financial development monotonically leads to higher levels of investment.
This is interesting because it implies that even with weak institutions, it is still possible
to have high levels of investments and this has generally been the case for many African
countries like Nigeria which in-spite of weak institutions have still managed to attract
significant investments especially in the private sector. The results are also similar when
we use government consumption as the structural variable as reported in Figure 4
5 Conclusion
This paper endeavours to uncover the structural and institutional determinants of the
variations in investments in Africa within a neoclassical framework. A simple neoclassical
model that captures the apriori expectation is described and taken to the data using
parametric and nonparametric regression techniques.
We obtain three main findings. First, we find that the main structural determinant
of investment in Africa is financial openness, while the main institutional determinant is
institutional quality. Secondly, we observe that there are nonlinearities in the relationship
between investment and structural characteristics of an economy. Specifically, there is a
threshold level of financial openness that guarantees high levels of investments. Thirdly,
20
when we interact the structural variable with the institutional variable, we find that the
investment inhibiting effects of financial openness is less in countries with higher levels of
institutional development.
The simple insight for policy arising from this paper is that in addition to the traditional
policy areas such as a stable macroeconomic environment, the investment climate in Africa
is characterized by the broader structural and institutional environment in which firms and
businesses operate. These includes, financial openness, financial development, government
consumption and the governance frameworks such as the control of corruption.
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Figure 5: Investment profile curves with bootstrap error bands
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Table 8: Correlation with Bonferroni p-values
Fix. Inv. Ln.inv Ln.GDP GDP.g Int. R. Inf. Gvt. Con. Fin. Op. Trd. Opn. Fin. Dev Inst. Qlty. Int. strc. Bus. Env. Hum. dev. TFP
Fixed Investment 1
linv -0.13∗ 1
LGDP 0.03 -0.65∗∗∗ 1
GDP growth 0.34∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.02 1
Interest rate 0.15∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.01 0.11 1
Inflation -0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.08 -0.61∗∗∗ 1
Govt. consumption 0.139∗ -0.15∗∗ -0.14∗ -0.09 0.10 -0.07 1
Financial openness 0.007 -0.13∗ -0.01 0.03 0.22∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.05 1
Trade openness 0.52∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.12 -0.14∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.06 1
Financial development 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.06 0.04 -0.16∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.07 -0.006 1
Institutional quality 0.16 -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.20∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.10 0.44∗∗∗ 1
Institutional structure 0.07 -0.04 -0.12 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.24∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1
Business environ 0.09 -0.04 -0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.11 0.31∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 1
Human cap. development 0.27∗∗∗ 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.13 0.197∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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